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GOVERNING FROM THE PULPIT: HOW
THE FIRST CIRCUIT IN ACLU OF
MASSACHUSETTS V. U.S. CONFERENCE OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS FAILED TO PREVENT A
GOVERNMENT AGENCY FROM
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CONTRACTING
ITS DUTIES TO A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION
ANNA M. LASHLEY*
When the government delegates its discretionary power to religious
institutions, it violates a fundamental right guaranteed by the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution—the freedom from government
entanglement with religion. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
was written to protect religious freedom from intrusion by the government by
preventing, to the extent possible, the imposition of either the church or the
government into the confines of the other. This separation between church and
state is essential to preserve the liberty of the American people and to ensure
that the nation stays true to its Constitution.
In 2009, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
violated the Establishment Clause when it formed a master contract with
the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB).
This contract
authorized the USCCB to allocate federal funds to subcontractors pursuant
to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, a discretionary duty
originally assigned to the HHS.
* Senior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 63; J.D.
Candidate, May 2014, American University, Washington College of Law; B.A.
Communication, 2010, Virginia Tech. Many thanks to Professor Stephen Wermiel for
his advice and support during the Comment-writing process, and for encouraging
me to think critically and ask questions about First Amendment jurisprudence.
Thank you to the American University Law Review Volume 63 staff for their hard work
in preparing this Comment for publication. Finally, a special thank you to my family
and friends, especially Jordan Cafritz, who were supportive and patient every step of
the way, even when I got a little crazy.
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This Comment demonstrates that such a delegation of discretionary power
violates all three of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause tests: the
Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test. The master contract
between the HHS and the USCCB was a direct violation of Americans’ First
Amendment rights. Until courts take action to prevent such contracts from
being formed in the future and limit the type of business interactions in which
the government and religious institutions may engage, the American people are
at risk of similar unconstitutional relationships being formed. Otherwise, this
continued entanglement between the government and religious institutions will
erode the religious liberty the nation has worked so hard to maintain and
protect throughout its history.
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INTRODUCTION
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment specifies that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.”1 Throughout U.S. history, the Supreme Court and scholars
have interpreted this clause to mean that there must be separation
between religion and the government.2
Although the First
Amendment does not explicitly mention this separation, the Court
has concluded that there is no question that the First Amendment
established that church and state should be separated.3 While
Thomas Jefferson discussed the concept of a “wall of separation”
between church and state,4 the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that “total separation is not possible” and that “[s]ome relationship
between the government and religious organizations is inevitable.”5
However, the Court has determined that the Establishment Clause at
least means that the “government may not promote or affiliate itself
with any religious doctrine or organization, may not discriminate
among persons on the basis of their religious beliefs and practices,
may not delegate a governmental power to a religious institution, and may
not involve itself too deeply in such an institution’s affairs.”6 In
addition, any idea of a “wall” between church and state is
“substantially breached” when the government puts discretionary
governmental powers in the hands of religious bodies.7
While the Supreme Court has made it clear that giving
governmental power to religious institutions is a violation of the
Establishment Clause, the federal government frequently delegates
such power. In 2001, for example, President George W. Bush created
the Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (FBCI), which ensured
that faith-based organizations could subcontract to receive federal

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122–23, 126–27
(1982) (invoking Thomas Jefferson’s concept of a “wall” of separation and
discussing Supreme Court precedent analyzing the purposes of the Religion
Clauses and the ability of religion and government to coexist); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) (asserting that the separation of church and
state “must be complete and unequivocal”).
3. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312.
4. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 122−23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (highlighting prior Supreme
Court rulings that did not require total separation between church and state).
6. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
590−91 (1989) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
7. See, e.g., Larkin, 459 U.S. at 123, 127 (holding that a state statute that gave
churches the right to determine whether applicants could obtain liquor licenses
violated the Establishment Clause).
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funding to provide public social services.8 The Supreme Court has
yet to rule on the constitutionality of such subcontracts;9 however,
allowing religious organizations to administer these services has
become a common and accepted practice.10
A novel type of contract sparked debate in 2009, when the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts decided ACLU of
Massachusetts v. Sebelius.11 The plaintiffs alleged an Establishment
Clause violation after the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) formed a “master contract” with the U.S. Conference
of Catholic Bishops (USCCB).12 This contract conferred to the
USCCB the authority to perform the duties of the HHS in allocating
federal funds to subcontractors pursuant to the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000.13 The contract also gave the USCCB the
discretionary power to decide which organizations would receive a
subcontract granting federal funds to provide services for trafficking
victims.14 Rather than addressing the larger constitutional issue of
these types of master contracts generally, the parties formed their
arguments around the specifics of the HHS-USCCB contract.15 The
district court therefore only analyzed this specific contract and found
that both the contract itself, as well as the way in which the USCCB
was performing under the contract, unconstitutional.16 The court
ruled this way because the USCCB awarded subcontracts only to
organizations that agreed not to use the federal funds to provide
victim services that conflicted with the USCCB’s religious beliefs.17
8. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,499 (Jan. 29, 2001), reprinted in 3
U.S.C. § 21 app. at 13–14 (2012).
9. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 605 (2007)
(plurality opinion) (refusing to rule on the constitutionality of the FBCI after finding
that the respondent lacked standing); see also infra Part I.B.2.
10. See Elbert Lin et al., Faith in the Courts? The Legal and Political Future of
Federally-Funded Faith-Based Initiatives, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 183, 186−88 (2002)
(discussing the long history of allocation of federal funds to religious
organizations that provide social services); see also infra Part I.B.3 (describing the
prevalence of the FBCI).
11. 821 F. Supp. 2d 474 (D. Mass. 2012), vacated as moot sub nom., ACLU of Mass.
v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013).
12. Id. at 477–78.
13. Id. at 476–77.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 488; see, e.g., Complaint, Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474 (No. 1:09-cv10038), 2009 WL 8500122; Defendant’s Answer, Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474 (No.
1:09-cv-10038), 2010 WL 7940343.
16. See Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (finding a violation because the HHS
delegated authority to a religious group “to impose religiously based restrictions
in the expenditure of taxpayer funds, and thereby impliedly endorsed [their]
religious beliefs”).
17. See id. at 487–88 (specifying that subcontractors could not use the funds to
provide victims contraceptives or abortion services).
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit avoided analyzing the
constitutionality of the formation of the contract when it reversed the
district court’s decision as moot.18
Although this case provided a potential opportunity for a court to
determine the constitutionality of these master contracts between the
government and religious institutions, the issue remains undecided,
and there is nothing to prevent similar contracts in the future. While
not officially deemed constitutional, subcontracts between
government agencies and religious organizations have become an
accepted practice.19 Yet, more powerful and potentially detrimental
master contracts have introduced new Establishment Clause issues.
This Comment argues that there is a constitutional limit on the
extent to which faith-based organizations can administer or
participate in federally funded social-service programs. It advances
the notion that general master contracts between the government
and a religious institution, which give the institution the authority to
allocate federal funds to subcontractors pursuant to a legislative act,
are a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Part I of this Comment briefly discusses the background of the
Establishment Clause and the different tests the Supreme Court has
developed to determine whether the Clause has been violated. This
Part also provides information about the creation, rules, and
regulations of the FBCI. Finally, this Part takes a more in-depth look
at the details surrounding ACLU of Massachusetts v. Sebelius.
Part II contends that any master contract between the government
and a religious institution violates the First Amendment. It discusses
the differences between these master contracts and the subcontracts
that are formed under the FBCI in order to demonstrate why the
master contracts are not valid under the FBCI. This Part also argues
that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the district
court mistakenly focused its Establishment Clause analysis on the
restriction the USCCB imposed because, under several Establishment
Clause tests, these contracts are unconstitutional regardless of
whether such restrictions exist.

18. See ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 48, 53
(1st Cir. 2013) (declaring the case moot on several grounds, including that “there
[was] literally no controversy left for the court to decide” because the contract had
expired, and the obligations between the parties had therefore ended).
19. See Lin et al., supra note 10 (highlighting the reasoning behind federal
funding for religious organizations); see also infra Part I.B (discussing the
establishment of the FBCI program, the Court’s refusal to rule on its
constitutionality, and its prevalence today).
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In conclusion, this Comment suggests that the role of religious
institutions and organizations, when it comes to receiving federal
funding, must be limited to providing services as a subcontractor
pursuant to the FBCI. Any extension of authority beyond that of
subcontractors, such as a general master contract, is
constitutionally prohibited.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Establishment Clause
In writing and signing the Constitution, the Framers sought to
create laws of the nation to protect the people and preserve their
liberty.20 The government has always acknowledged the role of
religion in American culture,21 and the United States has a history
and tradition of widespread religious diversity.22 The language of the
First Amendment reflects the desires of early Americans to abolish
conditions and practices limiting religious freedom “in order to
preserve liberty for themselves and for their posterity.”23 Fearing that
a new government would impose the same religious dictatorship that
they fled from in England, the American people realized that
religious liberty could be best achieved if the government was
prohibited from intruding on the religious beliefs of any individual.24
Accordingly, the religion provisions in the First Amendment were
intended to provide this protection.25
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court emphasized the
success of these religion provisions: “The structure of our government
has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal

20. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) (recognizing that the First
Amendment conveyed the Framers’ objective to protect the people from
“governmental intrusion on religious liberty”).
21. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673–78 (1984) (highlighting Supreme
Court precedent and the religious practices of the Framers of the Constitution to
emphasize the longstanding presence of religion in American culture).
22. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 589
(1989) (noting the “[s]ectarian differences among various Christian denominations
[that] were central to the origins of our Republic” and how people of various
religious faiths have made the United States their home).
23. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8 (referring to the First Amendment language declaring
that Congress “shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I)).
24. See id. at 8−13 (providing historical examples of religious oppression that led
to the adoption of the First Amendment, such as penalizing absences from
government-established churches).
25. Id. at 8.
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institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has
secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.”26
The Supreme Court, in its decades-long analysis of the
Establishment Clause, has looked to the country’s history and the
Framers’ intent in order to determine the meaning of the Clause.27
The Court has concluded that the Establishment Clause was intended
to protect against three main evils: “sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”28 The
purpose of the Clause is to prevent, to the extent possible, the
intrusion of either the church or the government into the confines of
the other.29 According to the Court, the key principle in any judicial
analysis of the Establishment Clause is that the “First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and nonreligion.”30
A separation between church and state, although not explicitly
mentioned in the First Amendment, is implied.31 However, the Court
has struggled to settle on the required degree of separation in light of
its recognition that absolute separation is not possible.32 The
Supreme Court is tasked with the duty of drawing the requisite line of
separation as issues arise.33 The Court has explained that the linedrawing process is very difficult, and has described the guidance of
the Establishment Clause as “a blurred, indistinct, and variable
barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular
relationship” between the government and religion.34
When
26. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871).
27. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122–23, 126–27 (1982)
(discussing the purpose of the Establishment Clause and how Thomas Jefferson’s
view of the separation of church and state should be applied); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612–14 (1971) (analyzing the “opaque” language of the Free Exercise
Clause to determine the Framers’ intended meaning); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 162–64 (1878) (utilizing Jefferson’s own language to understand the
concept of separateness).
28. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664,
668 (1970)).
29. See id. at 614 (reiterating the Establishment Clause’s goal of preventing the
entanglement of church and state, but recognizing that total separation is impossible).
30. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (quoting Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (using
precedent to explain the importance of religious neutrality to build tolerance and
respect for any and all religions).
31. See supra notes 3−5 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 3−5 and accompanying text (noting that religious practices
date back to the Framers of the Constitution, and realizing the historical importance
of both church and state in American culture).
33. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (asserting that because the Establishment
Clause’s language “is at best opaque,” it is the Court’s task to determine the
scope of the Clause).
34. Id. at 614.
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analyzing Establishment Clause issues case-by-case, the Supreme
Court has concluded that no single test or criterion can be applied to
adequately analyze every Establishment Clause issue.35 Instead, the
Court has assessed issues in several ways, primarily employing
three main tests: the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the
coercion test.36
The Lemon test and its evolution
One of the Establishment Clause tests courts employ is the threepart test first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.37 The case involved
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes that provided state aid to
nonpublic schools, including church-affiliated elementary and
secondary schools.38 The Court acknowledged the history of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and enunciated that any
Establishment Clause analysis must consider the cumulative criteria
that have developed in the jurisprudence over the years.39
The Court concluded that the precedent garnered three primary
questions, which in turn created three prongs that government action
must meet in order to be constitutional: “First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with
religion.’”40 The Court emphasized that, when analyzing the third
prong, courts “must examine the character and purposes of the
institutions that are benefited [by the government action], the nature
of the aid . . . provide[d], and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority” that results from the
government action.41 To pass the test, the government action at issue
must satisfy all three prongs.42
1.

35. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678−79 (1984) (“In our modern, complex
society, whose traditions and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage
diversity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in applying the
Establishment Clause is simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by the Court.”).
36. See Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 154 (5th Cir. 1991) (identifying the
different tools used in the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence and
recognizing “that there is no one readily and easily applicable test”).
37. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
38. Id. at 606−07.
39. Id. at 612.
40. Id. at 612−13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397
U.S. 664, 674 (1970)); see also Ashley M. Bell, Comment “God Save This Honorable
Court”: How Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled with the
Secularization of Historical Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1281–90 (2001)
(discussing the evolution of the three-prong standard).
41. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
42. See id. at 612–13.
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In applying the three-prong analysis to the Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island statutes, the Court held that both state programs
violated the Establishment Clause.43 It was clear that the statutes had
the secular purpose of enhancing the quality and standards of all
schools;44 however, problems arose with the question of
entanglement.45 The Court considered each statute separately and
determined “that the cumulative impact of the entire relationship”
resulting from both states’ statutory programs of aid for nonpublic
schools involved impermissible entanglement of church and
state.46 The Court reasoned that both statutes required continued
state action and supervision, as well as annual appropriations, and
therefore presented a risk of divisive political activity along
religious lines.47
The Supreme Court and lower courts have applied the Lemon test
to examine Establishment Clause questions for many years; however,
the Court has since modified the original test.48 The Court first
transformed the Lemon test in 1997 in Agostini v. Felton49 in order to
consolidate previously disparate considerations.50 Then, in 2000, the
Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Helms51 clarified the changes made in
Agostini and fleshed out the test’s second prong.52 Both cases
involved state programs that offered government aid to public and
private schools, including private religious schools.
Agostini
addressed a New York City program implemented under Title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 that made public
school teachers available to provide remedial education to
disadvantaged children in all public and private schools throughout
43. See id. at 613–14 (charging that the statutes involved excessive entanglement
between government and religion because the statutes were not aimed at advancing
religion at specific schools, but instead were administered “to enhance the quality of
the secular education in all schools covered by compulsory attendance laws”).
44. Id. at 613.
45. See id. at 614.
46. Id. at 614–22.
47. Id. at 622−23.
48. See Lin et al., supra note 10, at 200−04 (documenting the transformation of
the Lemon test).
49. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
50. See id. at 232–35 (modifying the Lemon test to analyze a New York City
program that used federal funds to provide remedial education to
disadvantaged children).
51. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
52. See id. at 807–08 (plurality opinion) (illuminating the legal analysis the
Court used in Agostini and applying it to an Establishment Clause claim against
state and federal school aid programs that resulted in federal funding being
given to religious schools in Louisiana); see also Lin et al., supra note 10, at 202–
04 (explaining the Mitchell test and Justice O’Connor’s view that the plurality
focused too heavily on neutrality).
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the city.53 Mitchell focused on a Louisiana program implemented
under Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement
Act, which allowed federal funds to be used to provide educational
materials and equipment to public and private schools.54 In these
cases, the Lemon test was reduced to the first two prongs; the third
prong, “excessive entanglement,” was combined with the second
prong and became one of several factors55 relevant to determining
the “principal effect” of the government action.56 The Court made
this change after recognizing that many of the considerations
evaluated under the entanglement prong were also contemplated
when determining the principal effect of the government action.57
The amended Lemon-Agostini-Mitchell test analyzes many different
factors. Similar to the original test, the first prong is whether there is
a secular purpose.58 While the Court retained the second prong from
the original test—whether the primary effect of the action is
advancing or hindering religion—it delineated three primary criteria
to evaluate this question.59
The first criterion is whether the government action resulted in
government indoctrination.60 The result of this inquiry depends on
whether any indoctrination that occurred could be reasonably
Courts often turn to the
credited to governmental action.61
“principle of neutrality” to decide whether the government action
resulted in any noticeable indoctrination.62 Under this neutrality
analysis, courts will sustain aid that was presented to a broad range of
groups or persons without respect to their religion.63 “If the
religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for
governmental aid . . . [and] the government is offering assistance to
recipients who provide . . . a broad range of indoctrination, the
government itself is not thought responsible for any particular

53. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209–14.
54. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801–02 (plurality opinion).
55. Other relevant factors courts employ to decipher the primary effect of the
government action include whether it results in government indoctrination, whether
aid recipients are defined by religion, and whether individuals have a genuine
independent choice. See id. at 808−11.
56. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232−33 (determining that the entanglement inquiry
of the Lemon test was instead a criterion to determine the primary effect of the
government action).
57. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808 (plurality opinion).
58. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233.
59. Id. at 233–34.
60. Id. at 234.
61. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (plurality opinion).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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indoctrination.”64 In Agostini and Mitchell, the Court assessed whether
any religious indoctrination that occurred in religious schools could
be attributed to the government programs at issue.65 The Court in
both cases held that government aid directly assisting religious
schools did not in itself generate government indoctrination.66
Additionally, the particular aid programs did not result in
indoctrination because the aid was offered on neutral terms to any
schools that furthered a legitimate secular purpose.67
The
governments in both New York and Louisiana implemented new
programs, improved existing platforms in the schools,68 and
allocated the aid based on neutral criteria.69 Therefore, the
Supreme Court concluded that neither program led to
impermissible government indoctrination.70
The second relevant criterion to the primary effect analysis is
whether the government action defines aid recipients with respect to
religion.71 Neutrality is also a factor under this criterion in
determining the permissibility of the disbursed aid.72 Specifically, the
issue is whether the criteria for selecting or allocating the aid create a
financial incentive for those seeking the aid or services to choose
religion over a secular alternative.73 If a court finds that aid was
allocated based on neutral, secular factors that neither favored nor
disfavored religion and that the aid was made available to multiple
beneficiaries—both
nonreligious
and
religious—on
a

64. Id. at 809−10.
65. Id. at 809; see Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230–31.
66. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809−11 (plurality opinion) (allowing
governmental assistance for legitimate secular purposes); Agostini, 521 U.S. at
230 (determining that placing employees in parochial schools does not, as a
matter of law, result in indoctrination).
67. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809−10 (plurality opinion) (inspecting the Louisiana
program); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231, 234–35 (reviewing the New York City program).
68. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 831 (plurality opinion) (purporting that the
Louisiana program in question channeled federal funds to public and private
elementary and secondary schools to employ “secular, neutral, and nonideological
programs”); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234–35 (emphasizing that the program sent
teachers to elementary and secondary schools to provide remedial education to
disadvantaged children).
69. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829 (plurality opinion) (elucidating that the amount
of funds distributed to each participating school was determined by student
enrollment); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 229 (clarifying that teachers are made available to
all eligible children, regardless of where they choose to attend school).
70. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808 (plurality opinion); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230.
71. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230–32, 234 (declaring that New York’s Title I
program does not advance religion, in part because it does not decide who receives
aid through reference to religious beliefs).
72. See id. at 231.
73. Id.
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nondiscriminatory basis, then no financial incentive was present.74
Also relevant to this analysis is whether a genuinely independent
choice is available to the individuals receiving services or benefiting
from the aid.75 If the individuals seeking services are offered a wide
range of providers—both religious and secular—from which they can
choose to receive services, then it is more likely that the aid was made
available without regard to the recipients’ religion.76
In Agostini, the Court noted that the New York City program made
educational services available to all children who met the eligibility
requirements—regardless of their religious beliefs.77 Also essential in
the Court’s determination was that eligible children were able to pick
where they wished to receive this education from a broad range of
secular and religious options.78 Eligible students received Title I
services based on criteria which neither favored nor disfavored
religion, regardless of individual religious beliefs.79 With no financial
incentive to modify religious beliefs, the Court held that the program
did not distinguish aid recipients based on religion.80
Similarly, the Court in Mitchell considered government aid
allocated to a religious institution a result of the private choice of the
individuals who would benefit from or receive the aid.81 The Court
determined that any aid ultimately distributed to a private religious
school through the Louisiana program was grounded solely on the
independent and private choices of parents as to where their
children would attend school.82 Additionally, because the aid was
generated based on the size of the school’s enrollment—which was
determined by the independent choice of parents—the program
allocated aid on the basis of neutral, secular criteria, and made the
aid available to religious and secular beneficiaries on a

74. Id.
75. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that the Court has,
on multiple occasions, considered whether government aid to religious institutions
was the result of an individual’s genuinely independent and private choice).
76. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225−26 (noting that federal funding went to the
religious schools only as a result of the genuinely independent choice of those
students deciding between religious and secular schools); see also Lin et al., supra
note 10, at 202–03 (discussing, in depth, the Mitchell plurality’s interpretation of
the Agostini modifications to the Lemon test, and explaining that if the
distribution of aid is determined by the private choice of individuals, then that
aid would be considered neutral).
77. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000) (plurality opinion).
82. Id. at 830.
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nondiscriminatory basis.83 Thus, there was no incentive for aid
recipients to choose religious over nonreligious schools.84
Finally, the last criterion used to evaluate the primary effect of the
government action is whether it creates excessive government
entanglement.85 While entanglement is important to consider, not
all entanglements have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion:
in order to constitute an Establishment Clause violation, the
government entanglement must be “excessive.”86
A court’s
entanglement analysis relies on multiple factors; however, one
commonly cited example of excessive entanglement is when constant
government monitoring and surveillance is needed to ensure that
religion is not given preference.87 In contrast to the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Lemon, where it found excessive
entanglement because the statute required constant government
surveillance in order to guarantee that states were properly
administering programs,88 the Court in Agostini found that
monthly visits by public supervisors to observe the Title I teachers
were sufficient to ensure that only secular material was taught, yet
did not reach the level of “excessive” entanglement.89
2.

The endorsement test
While the Lemon-Agostini-Mitchell test is a popular Establishment
Clause interpretive tool, it is not the only one used to determine
whether government action has violated the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment. The Supreme Court has declined to utilize only a
singular test when assessing whether an Establishment Clause
violation has occurred, and in some instances, the Lemon-AgostiniMitchell test cannot adequately answer the question at hand or fully
address the issues.90 In these situations, courts look to alternative

83. Id. at 829.
84. Id. at 830.
85. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232–34.
86. Id. at 233 (clarifying that some entanglement, or interaction between church
and state, is inevitable and tolerable).
87. See id. Compare, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 616–17 (1988)
(holding that some instances of minimal monitoring do not rise to the level of
excessive entanglement, such as government review of educational materials and
inspection of centers where programs are carried out), with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 619 (1971) (identifying a state program as excessively entangled because it
required constant state surveillance to ensure that subsidized teachers complied with
the Establishment Clause when choosing their teaching texts and materials).
88. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622−23.
89. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234−35.
90. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (articulating the Supreme
Court’s inability to apply one test or look at only certain criteria when assessing an
alleged Establishment Clause violation); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786
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methods of analysis. One recurring Establishment Clause question
that the Supreme Court began to pay particularly close attention to,
and that the Lemon test was not particularly useful for assessing, was
whether government action had the purpose of endorsing religion.91
In her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,92 Justice O’Connor
established what is now known as the “endorsement test.”93 The case
involved a Christmas display that the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island
constructed at a park in the heart of the city’s shopping district.94
The park was owned by a nonprofit organization.95 Within the
Christmas display was a Santa Clause house, a “SEASONS
GREETINGS” banner, a Christmas tree, and a nativity scene.96 The
plaintiffs sued the Mayor of Pawtucket, alleging that the nativity scene
violated the Establishment Clause.97 The majority of the Court briefly
applied the Lemon test and concluded that the inclusion of the
nativity scene satisfied all three prongs of the test, and therefore
found that there was no Establishment Clause violation.98
The majority opinion’s analysis in Lynch did not provide guidance
for subsequent cases assessing the constitutionality of the
government’s display of objects with religious significance.99
However, in evaluating the legality of the government display, Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence articulated a “sound analytical framework”
for the use of religious objects that focused on the notion of
endorsement rather than the Lemon test.100 Justice O’Connor
(1983) (declining to apply the Lemon test in analyzing whether state legislative prayer
violates the Establishment Clause); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 230, 252 (1982)
(concluding that the Lemon test was not relevant or necessary to assess the
constitutionality of a statute requiring religious organizations that receive less than
fifty percent of funding from members to register and report to the state).
91. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
592−94 (1989) (submitting that endorsement was a new area of focus and that the
majority opinion in Lynch was not useful in scrutinizing endorsement in situations in
which the government displayed objects with religious implications).
92. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
93. See id. at 688−89 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Endorsement sends a message
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community . . . .”). The endorsement test is now seen to be the controlling standard
for Establishment Clause cases. See Nontaxpayer Standing, Religious Favoritism, and the
Distribution of Government Benefits: The Outer Bounds of the Endorsement Test, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1999, 2005 n.50 (2010).
94. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 670–71.
97. Id. at 671.
98. See id. at 684–85 (approving the display’s secular purpose, lack of religious
advancement, and lack of excessive entanglement).
99. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
592−94 (1989) (pointing out that the majority opinion in Lynch was “none too clear”
and not useful in delineating constitutional and unconstitutional endorsements).
100. Id. at 595.
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explained that she wrote her concurrence “to suggest a
clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine” and
particularly how the Lemon test related to the principles preserved
in the Establishment Clause.101
The endorsement test was
necessary, according to Justice O’Connor, because focusing on
endorsement elucidated the analysis of the Lemon test and made
the Establishment Clause doctrine more clear-cut.102
The primary question in this endorsement analysis is whether the
government action is perceived to endorse a particular religion.103 As
a result, courts must look at what viewers would fairly understand to
be the purpose of the government action.104 The test is whether a
reasonable adherent of a particular religion would feel as though her
or his religion was being privileged as an insider or as “favored
members of the political community,” or whether a reasonable
nonadherent of the religion would feel as though she or he was an
outsider and another religion was being imposed or endorsed by the
government action.105
Part of the endorsement analysis is assessing whether the
government has conveyed or attempted to convey a message that
religion—or a particular religious belief—is favored or preferred.106
The Court has consistently determined that government
endorsement is unconstitutional when government action favors
religious belief over disbelief or shows preference for particular
religious beliefs.107
Justice O’Connor applied her test in Lynch and concluded that
because the nativity scene is seen as a traditional symbol of Christmas,
and not just of Christianity, and because it was combined with several
purely secular symbols in the display, a reasonable person would not

101. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687−89.
102. See id. at 689 (illustrating how political divisiveness can evince government
endorsement, but insisting that the inquiry should focus not on the divisiveness but
on the character of the activity causing the divisiveness).
103. Id. at 690.
104. Id. at 692.
105. Id. at 688.
106. Id. at 690 (explaining that the test involves both objective and subjective
measures of the government’s intended and perceived message).
107. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 601 (1989) (concluding that an indoor nativity display had the effect of
endorsing a patently Christian message and therefore violated the Establishment
Clause); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (finding that a Texas
sales tax exemption for religious periodicals violated the Establishment Clause);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (holding that the primary purpose of
a Louisiana act was to advance a particular religious belief, and therefore the act
endorsed religion and violated the Establishment Clause).

LASHLEY.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1/9/2014 3:48 PM

622

[Vol. 63:607

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

perceive the display as an endorsement of Christian beliefs.108 While
four Justices in Lynch dissented with the outcome of the majority and
concurring opinions, the dissent did mention that Justice O’Connor
was correct that the controlling question in the case was whether the
State had endorsed religion and that her opinion provided a helpful
analytical tool for considering this issue.109
The endorsement test has been central in striking down multiple
government actions for violating the Establishment Clause. For
example, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,110
the Supreme Court resisted the notion that the Lynch holding led to
the inference that all nativity displays were constitutional and instead
applied Justice O’Connor’s endorsement analysis.111
The case
concerned two holiday displays in downtown Pittsburgh.112 One was a
Christian nativity scene placed on the grand staircase of the
Allegheny County Courthouse and contained a banner proclaiming,
in Latin, “Glory to God in the highest.”113 The second display was an
eighteen-foot menorah placed outside the City-County Building next
to the city’s forty-five-foot Christmas tree and a sign that saluted
liberty.114 The Allegheny Court distinguished Lynch, noting that in
Lynch there was no Establishment Clause violation because the
nativity scene was a traditional symbol of Christmas displayed with
other purely secular symbols, but the nativity scene in Allegheny stood
alone.115 The Court found that the government, in placing this
display in the main part of the courthouse, was sending “an
unmistakable message that it supports and promotes the Christian
praise to God that is the [display’s] religious message.”116
Additionally, including a sign naming the Roman Catholic
organization that donated the nativity scene only made this
endorsement seem more likely.117 On the other hand, a plurality
found that displaying the menorah was not an Establishment Clause
violation because it was placed next to a Christmas tree, and a
reasonable adherent of the Christian or Jewish faiths would not view
108. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (analogizing between the
display and a museum exhibit by stating that “a typical museum setting, though not
neutralizing the religious content of a religious painting, negates any message of
endorsement of that content”).
109. Id. at 697 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
111. Id. at 595 (plurality opinion).
112. Id. at 578.
113. Id. at 580 & n.5.
114. Id. at 582, 587.
115. Id. at 598 (majority opinion).
116. Id. at 600.
117. Id.
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the display as an endorsement of either religion.118 Instead, this
display would likely be seen as a recognition of the winter-holiday
season.119 In her concurring opinion in Allegheny, Justice O’Connor
emphasized that an essential principle of the Establishment Clause is
that it, “at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to
take a position on questions of religious belief or from ‘making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in
the political community.’”120
Similarly, the Court invalidated a school policy that, among other
things, permitted student-led and initiated prayer at school football
games in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe.121 The Court
utilized the endorsement test—as well as the Lemon and the coercion
tests—to determine that the policy violated the Establishment
Clause.122 In its endorsement analysis, the Court rejected the Santa
Fe School District’s claim that the school was not involved and that
the students, not the schools, chose to have, and actually delivered,
the prayer.123 Instead, the Court found that the policy resulted in
both perceived and actual endorsement of religion because the
prayer was delivered on school grounds, at a school activity, and with
school resources.124 The pregame prayer was found to “bear the
imprint of the State,”125 and the Court asserted that based on the
context in which the prayer was delivered, “an objective Santa Fe
High School student [would] unquestionably perceive the inevitable
pregame prayer as stamped with her school’s seal of approval.”126
Based on the criteria set forth in the concurrence in Lynch,127 the
Court held that such a policy was an impermissible endorsement
because it sent the message to those members of the audience who
were adherents of a particular religion that they were insiders and
favored members of the school community, while sending the

118. Id. at 617–20 (plurality opinion).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 593−94 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
121. 530 U.S. 290, 294, 317 (2000).
122. See id. at 305, 314, 316–17.
123. Id. at 305.
124. Id. at 307−08.
125. Id. at 305 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 308.
127. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(articulating that an essential part of the endorsement analysis is whether a
reasonable adherent would feel as though he was an insider or a favored member of
the political community, or whether a reasonable nonadherent would feel as though
he were an outsider or a disfavored member of the political community).
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accompanying message to nonadherents that they were outsiders and
were not full members of the school community.128
3.

The coercion test
The final Establishment Clause test that the Supreme Court has
used is known as the “coercion test.” The coercion test was first
crafted in Lee v. Weisman.129 Daniel Weisman, on behalf of himself
and his daughter Deborah, brought an Establishment Clause claim
against the principal of Nathan Bishop Middle School in Providence,
Rhode Island.130 He alleged that the school’s policy of allowing
principals to invite members of the clergy to deliver prayers as part of
graduation ceremonies violated his daughter’s First Amendment
rights.131 In analyzing whether prayer during school graduation
ceremonies was consistent with the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court declared that the Lemon test was not
the appropriate analysis for the situation at hand.132 Instead, the
pervasive degree of government involvement with religious activity
was sufficient in and of itself to determine the constitutionality of
allowing a nonsectarian prayer at a school graduation.133 The Court
focused its reasoning on the concept of coercion, holding that the
Establishment Clause precludes the government from coercing
citizens into giving up their constitutionally guaranteed rights and
benefits in order to resist conformance to government-sponsored
religious practice.134 The coercion test stems from the undisputed
belief that “the Constitution guarantees that government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or
otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so.’”135
The legal test is whether the government action coerces a religious
belief or practice by putting pressure on or forcing an individual who
does not subscribe to a particular religion to follow or partake in the
128. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309–10.
129. 505 U.S. 577, 595–96 (1992).
130. Id. at 581.
131. Id. at 580–81.
132. See id. at 586−87, 599 (circumventing the “invitation” to reconsider Lemon and
instead finding that “[n]o holding of this Court suggests that a school can persuade
or compel a student to participate in a religious exercise”).
133. Id. at 587.
134. Id. at 587, 596. For example, in Lee, the Court found that the school was
violating many students’ right to freedom of religion by forcing them to acknowledge
the religious prayer being voiced at the graduation ceremony, and therefore
compelling them to forego their constitutional right. See id. at 596.
135. Id. at 587 (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
678 (1984)).
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observation of that religion.136 While coercion may be direct137 or
indirect,138 direct coercion is not required to violate the
Establishment Clause.139 Unconstitutional coercion may instead take
the form of “subtle coercive pressure” that obstructs a person’s true
choice about whether to participate in the religious activity at issue.140
Courts have also found that certain government action can
functionally coerce participation if individuals are forced to at least
acknowledge the religious activity.141
The Supreme Court in Lee found that including clergy members
who offer prayers as part of an official public school convocation
ceremony was unconstitutional government coercion.142 The Court
reasoned that although the school did not mandate attendance at
graduation or require students to stand during the prayer, there was
significant coercive pressure to attend and to stand and respect the
prayer at the ceremonies.143 Students who did not desire to
participate in the prayer were still required to be silent, and the
Court found that this silence amounted to functional coercion
because it could be perceived as functionally identical to partaking in
the prayer.144
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expanded the
coercion analysis in Kerr v. Farrey.145 There, an inmate brought a case
against the state prison alleging that the prison’s threat of penalties
compelled him to attend religious-themed Narcotics Anonymous
meetings with no alternative secular program.146 In determining
136. See id. at 593–95 (holding that the school district’s control of the graduation
ceremony puts pressure on attendees to participate in prayer); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d
472, 477 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing the types of cases in which courts have applied
the coercion test).
137. See, e.g., Kerr, 95 F.3d at 479−80 (insisting that an inmate was forced to
participate in the religious-based meetings because he was significantly penalized for
refusing to attend and was given no other option).
138. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (maintaining that although the students were not
forced to participate in the prayer, they were obliged to recognize that the prayer was
being given and to be silent during it).
139. See id. at 592 (specifically mentioning the issue of indirect coercion rather
than direct coercion).
140. Freedom from Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.
2010); see Lee, 505 U.S. at 588, 593 (finding that there was coercive pressure for
students to attend the graduation ceremony and to stand and respect the prayer and
contending that this pressure “can be as real as any overt compulsion”).
141. See, e.g., Hanover, 626 F.3d at 12−14 (contrasting a student’s silence during
group prayer in Lee as perceived participation in religious activity with the less overt
silence of a student choosing not to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance).
142. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592, 597.
143. Id. at 593−98.
144. Id. at 593.
145. 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996).
146. Id. at 473–74.
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whether the government action requiring the inmate to attend the
religious-based narcotics meeting was unconstitutional, the Seventh
Circuit laid out three factors for examining a potentially coercive
religious practice: (1) was there government action, (2) did the
government action amount to coercion, and (3) was the object of the
coercion in question religious or secular in nature?147 Focusing on
these three factors, the Seventh Circuit deduced that requiring the
inmate to attend the religious-based narcotics meetings was
coercion, that the coercion was religious in nature, and that the
coercion resulted in the state favoring religion over nonreligion.148
The court determined that the government action coerced the
inmate to observe religion in violation of the Establishment Clause
because the inmate had no option but to participate in the
religious-sponsored practice.149
The coercion test rounds out the three main tests that courts use in
order to analyze whether government action has violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Courts have utilized
these three tests to assess a variety of government actions people
believe are unconstitutional.150
B. President Bush’s Faith-Based and Community Initiatives
In 2001, President George W. Bush, by executive order and without
legislative authorization or support, created the White House Office
of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.151 The FBCI is a federal
program that ensures faith-based community groups and
organizations are as equally eligible as secular groups to compete for
federal funding to provide social services to the public.152 President
147. Id. at 479.
148. Id. at 479−80.
149. Id. (dismissing as insufficient the State’s claim that the Narcotics Anonymous
program’s religious aspects could include the nonreligious idea of will power).
150. See Lance E. Shurtleff, Case Note, Confusing Game Plan: The Court Has To Use
Every Play in the Book To Keep Prayer Out of High School Football—Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Jane Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000), 1 WYO. L. REV. 723, 730–34 (2001)
(explaining the evolution and application of the Lemon, endorsement, and coercion
tests). See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 599–600 (1989) (demonstrating how the placement of a crèche on the stairs of
the county building functions as an endorsement of Christianity by county officials)
151. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,499 (Jan. 29, 2001), reprinted in 3
U.S.C. § 21 app. at 13–14 (2012) (establishing the White House Office of Faith-Based
and Community Initiatives and directing it to lead the Administration’s effort to
expand the role of faith-based and other private community organizations in
delivering social services to the public and to strengthen their ability to meet the
needs of communities); see also Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S.
587, 593−94 (2007) (plurality opinion) (clarifying how religious groups may compete
for federal financial support without weakening their independence).
152. Hein, 551 U.S. at 593–94.
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Bush also issued separate executive orders to establish FBCI
Executive Department Centers in various federal agencies and
departments.153 All of these centers are funded through Executive
Branch appropriations, meaning that Congress has not acted to fund
these entities’ activities.154
1.

The rules and regulations
Under the FBCI, religious organizations have the same opportunity
to apply for federal funding as secular organizations and community
groups, so long as they seek to “achieve valid public purposes,” and
follow the “bedrock principles of pluralism, nondiscrimination,
To adhere to these
evenhandedness, and neutrality.”155
requirements, religious organizations or institutions seeking to apply
for grants or federal funding pursuant to the FBCI must adhere to
specified rules and regulations.156
Religious organizations are not to use any direct federal financial
assistance to support “inherently religious activities,” including
worship, religious instruction, or proselytization.157 Federal funds
may only be used for social services, and any organization wishing to
engage in inherently religious activities in connection with delivering
social services must segregate the religious activities from the social
services and pay for them with private funds only.158 While federal
funds may not be used to fund religious activities, individuals
receiving services from faith-based organizations may choose to
participate in the organization’s religious activities, but organizations
are barred from requiring such participation.159
Religious
organizations should reassure program participants that the
organizations can still receive aid even if a participant does not join
153. Id. at 594 & n.1 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,497 (Jan. 29,
2001), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 96; Exec. Order No. 13,280, 67 Fed. Reg.
77,145 (Dec. 12, 2002), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 99–100; Exec. Order No.
13,342, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,509 (June 1, 2004), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 99–100;
Exec. Order No. 13,397, 71 Fed. Reg. 12,275 (Mar. 7, 2006), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601 app. at 101–02) (explaining that the President charged these centers with
ensuring that faith-based community groups would maintain eligibility to compete
for federal financial support without jeopardizing their independence or autonomy).
154. Id. at 595.
155. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,499.
156. See Partnering with the Federal Government: Some Do’s and Don’ts for Faith-Based
Organizations, WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov
/government/fbci/guidance/partnering.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2013)
[hereinafter Do’s and Don’ts for Faith-Based Organizations] (outlining the rules faithbased organizations must follow in order to properly act under the FBCI).
157. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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in religious conduct and that participation, or lack thereof, will have
no effect on the services received.160 Finally, if an organization
receives federal money, it cannot choose to provide services to some
people while denying it to individuals who are otherwise eligible to
receive the service.161 Officials designating the subcontracts must
offer a secular alternative when a beneficiary does not wish to be
served by a faith-based provider.162 An organization that takes federal
funds and violates any of the specified requirements may be subject
to legal action.163
2.

The Court’s refusal to analyze the FBCI
Although many scholars and lower courts have questioned the
constitutionality of the FBCI,164 the Supreme Court has yet to take a
stance on the issue. In 2007, the Court had an opportunity to rule on
whether the use of federal money to fund the FBCI violated the
Establishment Clause in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,
Inc.165 The Freedom from Religion Foundation brought suit, alleging
that the directors of the White House Office and various executive
department centers violated the Establishment Clause by promoting
religious organizations as more worthy of federal financing than
secular organizations during conferences held as part of the FBCI
program.166 However, the Court refused to rule on the merits of the
case.167 Because the defendants were acting on behalf of the
President, not Congress, the Court found that the plaintiffs were not
challenging any congressional action and thus, that they lacked
taxpayer standing to bring suit in federal court.168
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Stanley W. Carlson-Thies, Faith-Based Initiative 2.0: The Bush Faith-Based and
Community Initiative, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 936 (2009).
163. Do’s and Don’ts for Faith-Based Organizations, supra note 156 (providing that
potential punishment includes loss of grant funds, repayment of the funds received,
payment of any damages awarded by court action, and even criminal prosecution).
164. See generally Kyle Forsyth, Neutrality and the Establishment Clause:
The
Constitutional Status of “Faith-Based and Community Initiatives” After Agostini and
Mitchell, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 593 (2003) (discussing the
constitutionality of the FBCI in lieu of Supreme Court precedent); Ira C. Lupu &
Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1
(2005) (detailing what the FBCI are, and determining that the FBCI will push the
limits of the Constitution).
165. 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (plurality opinion).
166. Id. at 592, 594–95.
167. See id. at 593 (ruling on the issue of standing).
168. Id. at 593, 605 (refusing to adopt a broad reading of an otherwise narrow
exception to the general bar on taxpayer standing to accommodate the plaintiffs’
claim). The plaintiffs attempted to establish standing by asserting that members of
the organization were federal taxpayers and that the Executive Branch’s use of
taxpayer dollars to fund the conferences violated their rights under the
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3.

The FBCI in effect today
In February 2009, President Barack Obama formed the White
House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships in an
effort to continue and expand upon President Bush’s initiatives.169
This expansion reflects the notion that religious organizations that
have received aid provide many social services to the public across the
country.170 Some of these services include HIV/AIDS prevention and
treatment programs, prisoner re-entry programs, drug treatment
programs, food banks, and expanding affordable housing.171
Until the Supreme Court addresses the constitutionality of the
FBCI and similar programs, the practice of allowing religious groups
and organizations to subcontract for federal funds and provide social
services to the public is likely to continue as an accepted practice as
long as certain rules and procedures are followed.172 This Comment
does not address the constitutionality of the FBCI, but simply
acknowledges the fact that the practice of allowing faith-based
organizations to use federal aid to provide valid public services is
currently allowed but is also potentially constitutionally problematic.

Establishment Clause. Id. at 592–93. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court
noted that paying taxes has long been held insufficient to establish standing. Id. at
593. Furthermore, a narrow exception to this general rule did not apply because
Congress did not specifically authorize funding for the conferences; rather, the
conferences were paid for through general appropriations to the Executive
Branch. Id.
169. Obama Announces White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships,
WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Obama
AnnouncesWhiteHouseOfficeofFaith-basedandNeighborhoodPartnerships (announcing
the creation of the new office and listing its key priorities, which include integrating
community groups into the nation’s economic recovery efforts, addressing issues
affecting women and children, supporting fathers and encouraging responsible
fatherhood, and working with the National Security Council to “foster interfaith
dialogue” worldwide); see also Carlson-Thies, supra note 162, at 932 (explaining how
Barack Obama, as a presidential candidate, announced that he would “expand and
improve” on President Bush’s FBCI program as President—a promise he later kept
by establishing the new office).
170. See Carlson-Thies, supra note 162, at 935, 937–38 (describing some of the key
roles faith-based organizations play in providing social services and noting that the
nation’s congregations make up “a major part of our social safety net”).
171. Id. at 937–38; see also John J. Dilulio Jr., Amen (Again) to Faith-Based Initiatives,
WASH. POST, (Jan. 28, 2013, 4:18 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/guestvoices/post/amen-again-to-faith-based-initiatives/2013/01/28/acfb709a-66b6-11e285f5-a8a9228e55e7_blog.html (illustrating the importance of faith-based groups in
providing necessary services across the country).
172. See supra Part I.B.2 (referring to the Supreme Court’s refusal to rule on
whether federal funding of the FBCI violates the Establishment Clause); see also supra
Part I.B.1 (describing the establishment of the FBCI and the regulations governing
faith-based organizations that accept federal funding).
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C. Taking the FBCI a Step Further: ACLU of Massachusetts v. Sebelius
1.

The underlying statute: The Trafficking Victims Protection Act
In response to the major issue of human trafficking in the United
States and worldwide, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000173 (TVPA or “the Act”).174 The three major
goals of the TVPA were to prevent human trafficking, protect and
provide support for trafficking victims as they rebuilt their lives, and
prosecute traffickers with more severe penalties.175 Part of the
protection aspect of the TVPA provides a wide range of benefits and
services—including cash, medical assistance, and social aid—to
trafficking victims under federal and state funded programs.176 These
benefits and services are available to U.S. citizens to the same extent
as refugees.177 Although not explicitly mentioned in the TVPA,
refugees receive medical care in the form of contraceptive material
and abortion services in certain situations178 through the Refugee Act
of 1980.179 Trafficking victims often require similar services.180

173. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§
7101−112 (2012); see also Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/trafficking/about/TVPA
_2000.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) [hereinafter TVPA Fact Sheet] (outlining the
history, purpose, and details of the TVPA).
174. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b) (documenting Congressional findings regarding the
existence of slavery and human trafficking throughout the world); TVPA Fact Sheet,
supra note 173 (naming trafficking as the “fastest growing source” of money for
organized crime groups and enterprises across the world).
175. TVPA Fact Sheet, supra note 173.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See ACLU of Mass. v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 477 n.5 (D. Mass.
2012) (citing to both the ACLU’s and the USCCB’s statement of facts, which
explained that “Medicaid and Refugee Medical Assistance pay for contraception
and abortions in the case of rape, incest, and when the woman’s life is in
danger”), vacated as moot sub nom., ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops, 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013).
179. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521−1524. The Refugee Act of 1980 created the Office of
Refugee Resettlement to help refugees become economically self-sufficient as fast as
possible after arriving in the United States. Id. §§ 1521(a), 1522(a)(1)(A). The
Refugee Act placed the HHS in charge of allocating the appropriated funds to
organizations that would provide medical, employment, and social services to
refugees pursuant to the Act. Id. §§ 1521(a), 1522(c).
180. See Carol Rose, First Circuit Court Should Defend Victims of Human Trafficking, AM.
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 6, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/religion-beliefhuman-rights/first-circuit-court-should-defend-victims-human-trafficking (explaining how
many trafficked women and children have been subjected to regular incidents of
forced sexual activity and may need a variety of medical services, including abortion
and contraceptive services and HIV and STD testing).
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2.

The formation of the contract between the HHS and the USCCB
Within the TVPA, Congress included a provision that put the HHS
in charge of using federal funds appropriated by Congress to
implement the victim services required under the Act.181 The HHS
was responsible for issuing grants and contracts to organizations and
institutions to provide medical services to victims of trafficking.182 For
five years, the HHS subcontracted with organizations that provided
the requisite services to the trafficked persons through competitively
selected grants.183 However, inefficiency and a lack of effectiveness
compelled the HHS to reexamine its approach.184 In 2005, the HHS
published a request for proposals to find a general contractor to take
over the HHS’s job of administering federal funds to the different
organizations pursuant to the TVPA.185
The USCCB was one of two applicants that responded to the
HHS’s request for proposals.186 During the application process, the
USCCB informed the HHS that if it were to win the contract it would
not allow any potential subcontractors to use federal funds for any
victim services that conflicted with the USCCB’s religious beliefs.187
Specifically, the USCCB stated that no subcontractors would be
permitted to provide or refer abortion services or contraceptive
materials with the funds that the USCCB allocated under the
TVPA.188 Despite this condition, in 2006, after what the HHS claimed
was a neutral selection process,189 the Agency awarded the USCCB the
master contract for managing the federal funds under the TVPA.190
The HHS-USCCB master contract lasted for five years until its

181. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(B)).
182. See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(B) (directing the HHS to “expand benefits and
services to victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons in the United States”).
Congress appropriated $5 million for such uses in Fiscal Year 2001 and as much as
$10 million for each subsequent year. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
183. See U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d at 49; Rose, supra note 180.
184. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d at 49.
185. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 476−77 (noting that, due to the Catholic nature of the organization, the
USCCB would “need to ensure that [its] victim services are not used to refer or fund
activities that would be contrary to [its] moral convictions and religious beliefs” and
would have to provide a disclaimer to potential subcontractors notifying them of this
requirement).
188. Id. at 477.
189. Id. at 487–88 (asserting that while the selection process may have been
neutral at the outset, the HHS’s decision to allow the USCCB to bar funds from
being used for abortions and contraceptives “was neither customary nor neutral”).
190. Id. at 477.
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expiration in 2011, and during that period the government awarding
the USCCB $15.9 million.191
3.

The lawsuit
The ACLU of Massachusetts brought suit against HHS officials on
January 12, 2009, alleging that the HHS contract with the USCCB,
which allowed the organization “to impose a religiously based
restriction on the use of taxpayer funds” violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.192 On March 23, 2012, the
Massachusetts District Court granted summary judgment in favor of
the ACLU.193 The court applied both the endorsement and Lemon
tests and found that delegating authority to a religious institution,
which imposed restrictions on the use of taxpayer money based on
religion, endorsed religion and failed the Lemon test.194 According to
the court, the then-expired HHS-USCCB contract violated the First
Amendment because it “impliedly endorsed the religious beliefs of
the USCCB.”195
The defendant-intervenor, USCCB, appealed the decision, and on
January 15, 2013, the First Circuit in ACLU of Massachusetts v. U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops196 dismissed the case as moot because the
contract between the HHS and the USCCB had expired.197 The court
vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case with
instructions to dismiss.198
II. A MASTER CONTRACT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND A
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION FAILS ALL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS AND
VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Circuit’s “decision leaves unanswered the legal question
of religious accommodation in the delivery of services under a federal

191. See id. at 478 & n.7 (stating that the original contract term lasted one year
with options for four yearly renewals, all of which the HHS exercised).
192. Id. at 478.
193. Id. at 474, 488.
194. See id. at 483−88 (rejecting the USCCB’s argument that the government’s
recognition of its restrictions was simply an accommodation of religious belief and
holding that the restrictions were instead an endorsement because they “provide[d]
a significant symbolic benefit to religion” and were not “truly voluntary” (quoting
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125–26 (1982))).
195. Id. at 488.
196. 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013).
197. Id. at 51, 58.
198. Id. at 48; see also Dennis Sadowski, Federal Court Panel Dismisses ACLU Challenge of
USCCB Trafficking Grant, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Jan. 17, 2013), http://ncronline.org/news/
politics/federal-court-panel-dismisses-aclu-challenge-usccb-trafficking-grant (explaining
the decision’s impact on the USCCB and the individuals it serves).
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contract.”199
Once again, a court failed to address the
constitutionality of allowing religious institutions to receive taxpayer
funds to provide social services.200 Although the contract between the
HHS and the USCCB has expired, there is no law in place to prohibit
similar contracts from being created in the future. In fact, the
USCCB stated that it would continue to seek opportunities to
collaborate with the government to provide these services.201 The
director of media relations for the USCCB, Mary Ann Walsh,
considered the First Circuit’s decision to vacate the district court’s
decision a limited victory for faith-based organizations, and admitted
that a ruling on the merits would have negatively affected future
contracts between the government and faith-based organizations
seeking to “exercis[e] their conscience rights.”202
Master contracts such as the HHS-USCCB contract will occur again,
and the real question, beyond standing and mootness, is whether the
mere formation of such contracts violates the First Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. The ACLU, in basing its constitutionality
argument only on the fact that there was a religiously motivated
prohibition on services missed an opportunity to have a court look at
the larger issue of government agencies delegating their duties to
religious institutions.203 As a result of the limited argument, the
Massachusetts District Court granted summary judgment on narrow
grounds, and declared the HHS-USCCB contract unconstitutional
solely on the restriction the USCCB put in place.204 Rather than
focusing on the specifics of the master contract, the ACLU should
have focused more broadly. Arguing that allowing a government
agency to contract with a religious institution in order to allow that
institution to implement provisions of a legislative act is
unconstitutional would have brought attention to this larger issue.
Had the ACLU argued that the government violated the First
199. Sadowski, supra note 198. Henry Dinger, the attorney who represented the
USCCB, admitted that the decision “doesn’t resolve anything on the merits (of the
ACLU’s claim).” Id.
200. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision not to
determine whether the FBCI violates the Establishment Clause).
201. ACLU of Mass. v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 481 (D. Mass. 2012), vacated
as moot sub nom., U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44.
202. Sadowski, supra note 198.
203. See Complaint, supra note 15, ¶¶ 3–5 (arguing only that allowing the USCCB
to dictate which services trafficking victims receive with federal funds violates the
Establishment Clause).
204. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (holding that the HHS violated the
Establishment Clause by granting authority to a faith-based organization, specifically
the USCCB, to enforce a religiously motivated restriction on the expenditure of
taxpayer dollars).
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Amendment when it formed a contract with the USCCB to put the
power of the HHS into the hands of the Catholic organization, the
case might have turned out very differently. If the court had looked
at contracts generally, instead of the details of this one contract, the
legal analysis might have resulted in an opinion that would have
prevented future master contracts between the government and
religious organizations.
Regardless of whether the religious
institution in charge of the master contract invokes religious
restrictions, the mere existence of a master contract between a
government agency and a religious institution is, in itself, an
Establishment Clause violation.
The following section explains how a master contract is different
from a subcontract that may be permitted under the FBCI. It also
suggests and illustrates a framework that courts should use when
examining master contracts using the three Establishment Clause
tests. Finally, it applies this framework to analyze the expired
HHS-USCCB contract as a whole rather than just analyzing the
religious restriction.
A. Master Contracts Are Not Comparable to the Subcontracts Permitted
Under the FBCI Because They Delegate More Power and Are Not Restricted by
Rules and Regulations
President Bush created the FBCI to provide faith-based
organizations with the same opportunities as secular organizations
when applying for federal grants to provide social services.205 Even if
the general public is prepared to accept the FBCI as constitutional—
or at least as a necessary means of providing important social
services—the master contracts create relationships that are
completely different from the subcontracted religious organizations
acting under the FBCI. Additionally, the master contracts break
many of the rules set forth by the FBCI.
To minimize the link between church and state and thus
circumvent the constitutionality issue, the FBCI included many rules
and regulations that control the subcontracts awarded to faith-based
organizations.206 Alternatively, the general master contract between
the HHS and the USCCB was wholly different from these
205. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593−94 (2007)
(plurality opinion).
206. See supra Part I.B.1; see also Carlson-Thies, supra note 162, at 936 (stating that
grant officials may not be biased in favor of or against faith-based applicants, that
applicants may not provide services on a religiously selective basis, and that
“inherently religious activities” must remain distinct from services funded by federal
monetary aid).

LASHLEY.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

GOVERNING FROM THE PULPIT

1/9/2014 3:48 PM

635

subcontracts, not only due to the amount of authority delegated to
the religious organization, but also due to the fact that the master
contract broke the rules and regulations that determine what is
permitted under the FBCI.
Rather than applying to be one of multiple service providers, the
USCCB was awarded the master contract to be the body that selects
service providers.207 Because the contract delegated this federal
agency function to the USCCB, the process directly conflicted with
the requirement that the federal agencies distributing subcontracts
must ensure that beneficiaries have an option to interact with
nonreligious service providers.208 The individuals seeking services
and the organizations applying for federal funding have no
alternative, such as working directly with a federal agency, to working
with the religious institution in charge of the master contract.209
Under the FBCI, the role of faith-based organizations is limited to
providing social services, and beneficiaries cannot be selected based
on religious preferences or beliefs.210 In contrast, the role of the
USCCB in the master contract was not limited to providing social
services; instead its role was vastly expanded to oversee all
organizations that provided such services.211 Even more worrisome,
the government has yet to implement any restrictions to prevent
religious institutions with such power from selecting subcontract
beneficiaries based on religion.212 Additionally, in order for a faithbased organization to act properly under the FBCI, it must ensure
that it separates religious activities from government-funded services
offered and that it does not use taxpayer money to fund any religious

207. See Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 476–77.
208. Carlson-Thies, supra note 162, at 936 (clarifying that, under the Charitable
Choice provisions initially implemented by President Bill Clinton in 1996, faith-based
organization officials must guarantee that beneficiaries have an option to interact
with nonreligious service providers if they so choose).
209. See generally Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 476–77 (explaining how the HHS, the
original entity with the authority to make grants to nonprofit organizations, handed
off this responsibility to one private, faith-based organization: the USCCB).
210. See Do’s and Don’ts for Faith-Based Organizations, supra note 156 (outlining
the rules faith-based organizations must follow in order to properly act under
the FBCI).
211. See Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (explaining that, pursuant to being
awarded the master contract, the USCCB subcontracted with service providers).
212. See ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 48
(1st. Cir. 2013) (avoiding ruling on whether selecting subcontractors based on
religious belief is permitted by finding that the contract at issue was moot). In fact,
under the HHS-USCCB contract, subcontractors were specifically selected only if
they would agree not to provide services or refer patients for services that were
against the beliefs of the Catholic religion. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 477–78.
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activities.213 With subcontracts, the government requires financial
status reports, strict record-keeping, and audits to guarantee that
the religious organization is separating its religion and religious
activities from any services funded by the government.214 However,
no such safeguards are found regarding master contracts.
Furthermore, there was nothing to certify that the USCCB or a
similarly situated religious institution would separate its religion
from its use of government funds.215
The master contracts grant more power and authority than the
subcontracts,216 allow for discretion with government funds rather
than strictly designating a particular use for the funds,217 do not
have safeguards in place to prevent religious beliefs from
influencing the organization’s policies,218 and fail to offer the
secular alternative that is required under the FBCI.219 As such, the
master contracts are entirely separate from any FBCI subcontracts
granted to faith-based organizations.
B. Master Contracts Fail All Three Establishment Clause Tests
These master contracts are so different from the subcontracts
permitted under the FBCI that a rigorous Establishment Clause

213. See supra Part I.B.1 (delineating the requirements for acting correctly
under the FBCI); see also Do’s and Don’ts for Faith-Based Organizations, supra note
156 (same).
214. See WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED & CMTY. INITIATIVES, GUIDANCE TO FAITHBASED AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS ON PARTNERING WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 6–
7, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/fbnp/pdfs/GuidanceDocument.pdf (last
visited Nov. 20, 2013) (listing the legal obligations that accompany a federal grant).
215. See Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 482, 485 (providing no mention of precautions
taken to ensure that the USCCB separated its religion from its duties and describing
how, in fact, the USCCB explicitly did not separate the two by invoking the religionbased restriction).
216. See supra notes 210–211 and accompanying text (highlighting that while
subcontractors simply provide social services to eligible beneficiaries, the master
contractor oversees all of the subcontractors providing these services); see also supra
note 207 and accompanying text (stating that the organization awarded the master
contract is granted the expanded responsibility of selecting subcontractors).
217. See supra notes 214–215 and accompanying text (asserting that no measures
exist to ensure that the USCCB or another master contractor would be required to
use federal funding solely for nonreligious activities).
218. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (noting that the government allows
faith-based organizations awarded the master contract to impose religiously
motivated restrictions on subcontractors’ use of federal funds); supra notes 214–215
and accompanying text (describing how the safeguards put in place to ensure that
faith-based subcontractors do not use government funds for religious activities do
not apply to master contractors).
219. See supra notes 207–209 and accompanying text (concluding that, because a
faith-based organization was awarded the master contract and given the sole
authority to award subcontracts, organizations have no alternative but to use the
federal funding they receive in a manner that adheres to religiously motivated rules).

LASHLEY.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

GOVERNING FROM THE PULPIT

1/9/2014 3:48 PM

637

analysis is required to determine whether they are constitutional. As
discussed in Part I, there are several Establishment Clause tests; any
master contract formed between the government and a faith-based
institution is likely unconstitutional regardless of the test applied.
Applying the Lemon-Agostini-Mitchell test
The district court’s opinion in Sebelius discussed the Lemon-AgostiniMitchell test but only in reference to the government’s delegation of
authority to the USCCB to impose restrictions on the types of services
available under the TVPA.220 When the government action at issue is
the making of the master contract, however, additional lines of
inquiry are relevant to a court’s analysis.
In addressing the first question of the Lemon-Agostini-Mitchell test—
whether the government action has a secular purpose221—a master
contract awarded to a religious organization likely satisfies this prong.
Similar to the government actions in Lemon, Agostini, and Mitchell, in
which the government alleged that the actions had the secular
purpose of providing educational services to students,222 the HHSUSCCB contract had the secular and primary purpose of providing
money to give services to trafficking victims pursuant to the TVPA.223
Because these contracts all involved using money to implement
provisions of legislative acts, they almost certainly contained a secular
purpose to pass the first prong of the test.224
The master contract becomes problematic when analyzed under
the second prong—whether the primary effect of the government
action either advances or hinders religion—and the three criteria
1.

220. See Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 486−87.
221. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (stating that the first prong
did not change from the original Lemon test); see also supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
222. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829–30 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(acknowledging that “[t]he program makes a broad array of schools eligible for aid
without regard to their religious affiliations or lack thereof”); Agostini, 521 U.S. at
234–35 (holding that a program providing supplemental remedial education,
granted to recipients on a neutral basis, does not run afoul of the Establishment
Clause where the instruction is distributed by public employees on the campus of
sectarian schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (invalidating
programs in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania providing direct aid to parochial schools
for supposedly nonreligious educational purposes).
223. See Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (explaining that the HHS sought to
find a general contractor to administer the funds to organizations working with
trafficking victims).
224. It would be difficult for these contracts to fail this prong, as the government
is not required to promulgate programs based solely upon a secular purpose, and
even an action partly motivated by a religious purpose may still satisfy this prong. See
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (acknowledging that a law may be
invalidated only if it seeks to advance religion without any secular purpose).
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that are used in this inquiry.225 A key aspect of whether the contract
results in government indoctrination226 is whether the formation of
the contract gives rise to the distribution of federal aid based on
religious beliefs or whether it is offered to a variety of groups without
regard to religion.227 Clearly the HHS-USCCB contract resulted in
allocation of federal aid to subcontractors based on whether the
services offered were against certain religious beliefs.228 However,
this result may not have been as evident without USCCB’s
articulated restriction. While it may be possible for a religious
organization to select subcontractors in a neutral manner, some
may find it challenging to ignore core beliefs and ideals229—or to
ignore the beliefs of potential subcontractors—when deciding
whether to award aid.230
The question of neutrality also arises when looking at whether an
aid recipient—the subcontractors in this case—is defined with
respect to religion,231 and specifically whether there exists a financial
incentive for aid recipients to choose religion over a secular
alternative.232 Put another way, the inquiry must be whether the
HHS-USCCB contract gave federal fund recipients any incentive to
225. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612−13 (creating the famous three-pronged Lemon test
which, in part, provides that a law’s “principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion”); see also supra text accompanying notes 60,
71, 85 (defining the three criteria of the second prong as (1) whether the
government action resulted in government indoctrination, (2) whether the
government action defines aid recipients with respect to religion, and (3) whether it
creates excessive government entanglement).
226. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233 (asserting that all three criteria must be
examined in scope and that “the last two considerations are insufficient by
themselves” to determine whether the government action results in
government indoctrination).
227. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827–28 (plurality opinion) (asserting that, if a program
offers to aid both religious and nonreligious recipients, it is unclear what type of
constitutional violation a program would engender without more specified analysis
into the secular or religious purposes of the governing law).
228. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 476–77 (discussing the USCCB’s position that
it cannot be associated with entities that perform abortions or offer
contraceptives to clients).
229. See generally Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125−26 (1982)
(recognizing that a faith-based organization may abuse its power to benefit
religion but that, even assuming that a faith-based group may act in good faith in
exercising power governed to it by statute, “the mere appearance of a joint
exercise of legislative authority by Church and State” may instill in some people
the notion that the faith-based group may use its power to benefit religion and
those that practice it).
230. See generally USCCB Mission, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb
.org/about/usccb-mission.cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) (explaining that “[t]he
Gospel of Christ and the teachings of his Church guide the work of the USCCB”).
231. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233 (providing this as the second criterion to take
into account in establishing the primary effect of the action).
232. See id. at 231 (including these incentives for choosing religion as an aspect of
the second criterion).
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modify their religious beliefs in order to be selected as a
subcontractor.233 Unlike in Agostini and Mitchell, where the Supreme
Court found that no financial incentive existed because aid was
awarded to eligible students regardless of their religious beliefs,234 the
USCCB selected which organizations were to receive aid based on
whether the organizations would tailor their spending to comply with
the USCCB’s religious beliefs.235 The USCCB allocation was not
comparable to a program that provides aid to all disadvantaged
students or schools that meet the requirements; with the master
contract at issue, organizations that were otherwise eligible may have
been denied a subcontract at the USCCB’s discretion. The USCCB’s
restrictions on abortion and contraceptive services made accepting
the group’s religious practices a prerequisite to receiving funds.236
Even without the restrictions in place, organizations that knew they
were applying to the USCCB may have felt as though there was a
better chance of being awarded a subcontract from the Catholic
organization if they adopted or accepted such religious beliefs.237
Additionally, the inquiry into whether aid recipients are
determined with respect to religion should include an assessment of
whether individuals seeking service providers have a choice between a

233. See id. at 232 (holding that the New York City Title I program at issue did not
give aid recipients any incentive to change their religious practices or beliefs in order
to obtain such aid).
234. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829–30 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(acknowledging aid distribution according to enrollment size without any
consideration of religious affiliation); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (finding that all
children who met the Act’s eligibility requirements were awarded services, no matter
what religious beliefs they possessed).
235. See ACLU of Mass. v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476−78 (D. Mass. 2012)
(providing the backstory on how HHS awarded the general contract to the USCCB
and further explaining that the USCCB provided over 100 grants to different
institutions, many of which were not Catholic institutions, for the purposes of
assisting victims of trafficking), vacated as moot sub nom., ACLU of Mass. v. U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013).
236. See id. at 477 (describing how the USCCB entered into subcontracts with over
100 organizations providing services and that the subcontractors were required to
agree to adhere to the abortion/contraception restriction).
237. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s assertion in
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc. that the appearance of a “joint exercise” of power by
church and state may lead some to conclude that the faith-based group will use its
power to advance religious views). To satisfy restrictions against incentivizing
religious practices, aid must be allocated based on criteria that do not factor religion,
and must make funds available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a
completely nondiscriminatory basis. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231 (distinguishing
acceptable criteria in governmental aid distribution schemes); e.g., Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653−54 (2002) (holding that no financial incentives
existed because a program offering educational scholarships to parents were
awarded with no reference to religion and no benefit to using the scholarship for a
religious school over a secular school).
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wide range of religious organizations and secular organizations.238 A
master contract with a religious organization removes alternatives for
organizations seeking to subcontract and for individuals seeking
services. Neither party has any alternative but to interact with the
religious institution charged with distributing the federal funds.239
This lack of alternatives contradicts the Supreme Court’s conclusion
in Mitchell that government aid to religious institutions is permitted
only when it is the result of the beneficiary’s genuine, independent
choice to receive the aid from a secular or religious provider.240
Independent choice, after a master contract is awarded to a religious
organization, hinges entirely upon whether the religious organization
provides funds neutrally to religious and nonreligious institutions.241
If genuinely independent choices are not available for
organizations and individuals, the master contract fails the second
criterion of the indoctrination question, and in turn fails the
Lemon-Agostini-Mitchell test.242
The contract between HHS and USCCB also fails to meet the third
criterion of the second prong in the Lemon-Agostini-Mitchell test—
whether the formation of the master contract results in excessive
entanglements between the government and religion.243 Specifically,
the contract between the HHS and the USCCB resulted in a direct
238. See Agostini, 521 at 225–26 (emphasizing that federal aid was given to the
religious schools solely as a result of the genuinely independent choice of those
students deciding between religious and secular schools); see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at
809 (plurality opinion) (articulating that the Supreme Court has, on multiple
occasions, considered whether government aid to religious institutions was the result
of an individual’s genuinely independent and private choice); Lin et al., supra note
10, at 202–03 (discussing the Mitchell Court’s interpretation of the Agostini
modifications to the Lemon test, and explaining that if aid is distributed to religious
schools based on the private choice of individuals, then that aid is neutral).
239. See U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d at 49 (stating that the HHS
sought a general contractor responsible for selecting grant recipients to offer services
to trafficking victims).
240. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (plurality opinion) (asserting that any
government aid provided to religious schools pursuant to the genuine independent
choice of parents is permissible).
241. See id. at 810−11 (explaining the relationship between the principles of
neutrality and private choice and that the possibility of genuinely independent
choice is a way of assuring neutrality).
242. See id. at 810 (finding that “if numerous private choices, rather than the
single choice of a government, determine the distribution of aid pursuant to neutral
eligibility criteria, then a government cannot . . . grant special favors that might lead
to a religious establishment”); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 487 (1986) (holding that the program in question satisfied this prong because
“[a]ny aid provided . . . that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a
result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients”).
243. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234 (providing the third criterion, that laws
creating an excessive entanglement between government and religion are
violative of the Constitution).
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entanglement by placing discretionary governmental power to
control federal funds into the hands of a Catholic organization.244
The master contract fails this prong of the test due to excessive
entanglement for the same reasons as the state programs in Lemon.245
The Court’s opinion in Lemon recognized the perpetual government
supervision required to safeguard citizens from constitutional
violations of excessive entanglement between state governments and
religion.246 Similarly, to ensure that religious beliefs were not taken
into account when the USCCB awarded subcontracts, the
government would have needed to constantly monitor the selection
process. Unlike in Agostini where the monitoring efforts were
considered minimal,247 the requisite efforts to oversee the distribution
of subcontracts would result in a level of entanglement that the
Supreme Court has previously deemed “excessive.”248 Requiring
continuing government surveillance to guarantee that the USCCB—
or another religious institution—did not favor religious organizations
for subcontracts, or did not impose religious restrictions, results in
unconstitutional entanglement.249
244. See ACLU of Mass. v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 487 (D. Mass. 2010)
(asserting that the HHS gave USCCB discretionary authority), vacated as moot sub
nom., U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44; see also Larkin v. Grendel’s Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126−27 (1982) (concluding in the Court’s entanglement
evaluation that discretionary governmental powers were not meant to be delegated
to—or shared with—religious institutions).
245. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971) (acknowledging that a Rhode
Island program required extensive state auditing to ensure funds went to primarily
secular activities and that the measure was “fraught with the sort of entanglement
that the Constitution forbids”); see also id. at 620–21 (holding that a Pennsylvania
program also at issue required “the very [same] restrictions and surveillance
necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly non-ideological role giv[ing] rise to
entanglements between church and state”).
246. See id. at 614, 622–23 (concluding that the programs excessively entangle the
government in religion, and recounting the intentions of the Framers to prevent
future political divisiveness caused by such excessive entanglement).
247. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234–35 (holding that program supervisors’
unannounced monthly audits to ensure that government-sponsored remedial
supplemental education provided by state employees embedded at parochial schools
was “[]sufficient to prevent or detect inculcation of religion by public employees”).
248. See id. at 233 (mentioning that whether pervasive monitoring by the public
authorities is required as one of the grounds excessive entanglement rests on);
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 616–17 (1988) (holding that while government
monitoring may result in excessive entanglement in certain situations, the disputed
and minimal review of grant applications, coupled with government employee site
visits, did not amount to excessive entanglement).
249. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616 (discussing how the Rhode Island program at
issue involved excessive entanglement between the state and religion because the
state must provide surveillance to ensure that the statutory restrictions were being
obeyed in implementing the program); see also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 615 (mentioning
the “Catch-22” issue that “the very supervision of the aid to assure that it does not
further religion renders the [government action] invalid” because it leads to
excessive entanglement, and finding that although some supervision of the
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The HHS-USCCB contract had a secular component and would
thus prevail on an inquiry under the first prong of the Lemon-AgostiniHowever, there is potential for government
Mitchell test.250
indoctrination from the likely appearance of financial incentives to
modify religious practices, an absence of any choice for
subcontractors to interact with a different religious or secular
institution, a potential lack of a genuine private choice, and excessive
entanglement from constant monitoring. For these reasons, the
HHS-USCCB master contract had the primary effect of advancing
religion and would fail the second prong of the test.251 Failing the
prong, and therefore the test, leads to the conclusion that the
creation of the master contract was a violation of the
Establishment Clause, and was accordingly unconstitutional under
the First Amendment.
2.

Applying the endorsement test
As discussed in Part I, the endorsement test looks at what the
public would fairly understand to be the purpose of the government
action.252 This inquiry includes an assessment of how a reasonable
adherent or nonadherent to the religion involved would look at the
government action.253
The Massachusetts District Court looked briefly at the endorsement
test in its analysis of the HHS-USCCB contract and determined that
the government impliedly endorsed the religious beliefs of the
USCCB in allowing the “religious organization to impose religiously
based restrictions on the expenditure of taxpayer funds.”254 The
district court applied the endorsement test narrowly, looking solely
at the restriction on reproductive services, to determine that
government action was required, it was less intensive monitoring and therefore did
not amount to the level necessary to find the entanglement excessive).
250. The reasoning behind the creation of the master contract was to select a
general contractor for administering funds under the TVPA. ACLU of Mass. v.
Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476 (D. Mass. 2012), vacated as moot sub nom., ACLU of
Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013).
251. See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126–27 (1982) (holding that a
statute providing churches with the authority to unilaterally block liquor license
applications enmeshed religion in the exercise of substantial governmental powers—
resulting in excessive entanglement that violates the Establishment Clause); Sebelius,
821 F. Supp. 2d at 476–78 (summarizing the HHS’s decision to award the contract to
USCCB despite the group’s requirement that subcontractors not provide abortion or
contraceptive services to clients).
252. See supra Part I.A.2 and accompanying text.
253. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that excessive entanglement may have an effect of creating political divisions
between religious followers and nonadherents).
254. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 488.
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permitting the USCCB to enact such a restriction would cause an
objective observer to believe that the government was endorsing
Catholic beliefs.255
In fact, if the endorsement test were applied to the master contract
generally, rather than just to the restriction, the government action
of forming the master contract would similarly fail the test. By
placing the discretionary powers of a federal agency into the hands of
the USCCB, the federal government—via the HHS—gave its
authority to the Catholic Church.256 Similar to the Supreme Court’s
determination regarding the nativity scene in County of Allegheny, the
government, in forming this contract, sent an “unmistakable message
that it supports and promotes” the Catholic religion and that it
endorses the religious message of the USCCB.257 Unlike in Lynch,
where the government action of putting up the nativity scene was not
found to endorse religion because it was combined with several
purely secular symbols, the government action in forming the master
contract vested high authority in one religious institution while
failing to grant any secular organization with comparable authority.258
The HHS-USCCB contract created a problem similar to that found
in the policy allowing student prayer at school football games in Santa
Fe.259 The contract is analogous to the school district policy in that
the public would perceive the religious message of the USCCB, like
the prayer in Santa Fe, to bear the seal of approval of the government,
regardless of the government’s efforts to distance itself from the
religious nature of the USCCB.260 The appearance that the
government sponsored the religious beliefs of the USCCB sent a
secondary message, similar to that in Santa Fe.261 The message
was that Catholics were insiders and favored members of the
255. See id. at 485 (rejecting arguments that the government made an
accommodation to the USCCB when it awarded the general contractor bid to the
religious conference and instead narrowly focused on the religious motivations
behind the USCCB’s restrictions).
256. See generally id. at 476 (quoting the USCCB as stating that it is a “Catholic
organization” (emphasis added)); USCCB Mission, supra note 230 (maintaining that
the USCCB is a Catholic organization guided by the word of Christ).
257. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
600 (1989) (declaring that the nativity display on its own can be construed as the
government’s endorsement of Christian beliefs).
258. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the
combination of secular and religious symbols in the display as the reasoning for
concluding that the display was not an endorsement of religion).
259. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
260. See id. at 308 (conveying the notion that members of the audience at the
football games will view any religious prayer as being approved by the school even
though the students chose to deliver a prayer and made all requisite efforts to do so).
261. Id. at 309.
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political community, especially for selection as subcontractors,
while non-Catholics were outsiders and disfavored members of
the political community.262
The master contract sent the message that the government
promoted the Catholic beliefs of the USCCB, and in turn failed the
primary question of the endorsement test: whether a reasonable
adherent would identify the government action as supporting his
religion. Therefore, the contract between the HHS and the USCCB
fails the endorsement test and violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.
3.

Applying the coercion analysis
The final Establishment Clause analysis to consider is whether the
formation and existence of the master contract between the HHS and
the USCCB resulted in unconstitutional, coercive pressure. If such
coercion existed and interfered with a person’s or organization’s
choice about whether to participate in a religious activity or religious
belief, or required that person or organization to give up rights in
order to avoid participation, then the government action was
unconstitutionally coercive.263
To determine whether the HHS-USCCB master contract coerced
religious beliefs or practices it is relevant to look at the three crucial
points that the Seventh Circuit articulated in Kerr v. Farrey.264 First,
the HHS clearly engaged in government action265 by seeking out
general contractors, and, through a selection process, entering into a
contract with the USCCB.266 The next question is whether the action
of forming the contract resulted in coercion.267 In Kerr, the Seventh
Circuit grappled with an inmate’s need for narcotics rehabilitation
through group counseling and the religious affiliations of the only

262. See id. (asserting that school sponsorship of a religious message sends the
ancillary message to members of the audience who are adherents that they are
insiders, and the accompanying message to nonadherents that they are outsiders).
263. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593−96 (1992) (applying the coercion test
to conclude that a student may exercise the option to abstain from participation in a
graduation ceremony containing a religious invocation and group prayer, and that
such abstention is predicated upon a desire to avoid the schools impermissible and
indirectly coercive effect of exacting religious conformity amongst students).
264. Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1996).
265. See generally id. (describing the three main points in the coercion analysis).
266. See ACLU of Mass. v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476−78 (D. Mass. 2012)
(describing the process of forming the contract), vacated as moot sub nom., ACLU of
Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013).
267. Kerr, 95 F.3d at 479 (listing the three crucial points in the coercion analysis,
the second of which prescribes an inquiry into whether the actions of the
government amount to coercion).
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program available to provide such counseling.268 Regarding the
HHS-USCCB master contract, organizations risked forgoing federal
aid to assist in providing social services to trafficked victims if they did
not apply for subcontracts to obtain money under the TVPA, and
their only path for doing so was through a religious institution.269
Therefore, the pressure to do a certain activity—apply for a
subcontract—and the consequences of not doing the activity—
foregoing federal funding—as well as the fact that the only means to
do such an activity was to go through a religious institution, resulted
in coercion.270 Finally, the remaining question is whether the
coercion was religious in nature.271 The clearly religious nature of
the twelve-step Narcotics Anonymous program, which was “based on
the monotheistic idea of a single God or Supreme Being,” was
sufficient for the court in Kerr to find that the coercion was
religious.272 Similarly, the religious nature of the USCCB, as a
Catholic organization whose mission is to do work guided by “[t]he
Gospel of Christ and the teachings of his Church,”273 is enough to
lead to the same conclusion—the coercion was religious.
Rather than being directly coercive, the master contract may have
entailed “subtle coercive pressure,”274 or may even have been
functionally coercive.275 The existence of the HHS-USCCB contract
required every potential subcontractor, as well as every trafficked
victim seeking services promised by the TVPA, to interact with a
Catholic institution. The Court in Lee utilized a three-part syllogistic
analysis to conclude that silence during convocation prayers
functionally coerced students into religious expression.276 That
silence was the equivalent of participating in the prayer, and the
Court concluded that the students were being functionally coerced
268. See id. (restating the inmate’s allegations that prison authorities were
coercing him into religious activities because the prison only offered him a
religiously based Narcotics Anonymous program).
269. See Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 477−78 (reviewing the USCCB’s power to select
subcontractors).
270. Cf. Kerr, 95 F.3d at 479−80 (holding that the pressure put on the inmate to
attend narcotics rehabilitation at risk of serious consequences, and the lack of a
secular option for him to adhere to such pressure, gave rise to coercion).
271. Id. at 479.
272. Id. at 480.
273. USCCB Mission, supra note 230.
274. See Freedom from Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1, 12 (1st
Cir. 2010) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992)) (making the
distinction between direct coercion, and subtle coercive pressure that interferes with
the “real choice” whether to participate in the activity at issue).
275. Cf. Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (explaining how student silence during religious
prayer functionally coerced participation in religious activity—where such silence is,
as adopted by worshippers, a form of religious expression).
276. Id.
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into partaking in the prayer.277 Operating under this analysis,
organizations and individuals were coerced into interacting with the
USCCB: the USCCB is a Catholic organization, and organizations or
individuals looking to provide or receive services pursuant to the
TVPA were functionally coerced into interacting with or supporting
the Catholic Church.278
Similar to the government action of including organized prayer
within graduation ceremonies and the government action of
requiring an inmate to attend a religiously based narcotics program,
the master contract between the HHS and the USCCB fails the
coercion test and therefore is a violation of the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was intended
to protect religious liberty by creating a separation between the
government and religion. The Supreme Court has specifically
stated that putting discretionary governmental powers in the hands
of religious bodies is a substantial breach of the separation between
church and state.
The issue of master contracts between government agencies and
religious institutions, such as the one between the HHS and the
USCCB, is one that the country will face again. The USCCB has
admitted its interest in forming similar contracts in the future, and
additionally, the Massachusetts District Court emphasized that there
can be no assurance that the type of contract challenged in ACLU of
Massachusetts v. Sebelius will not be repeated. Courts must address
the Establishment Clause issue created by such contracts and they
must articulate the constitutional problem with entering into them.
The role of religious organizations, with regard to federal taxdollars, must be limited to that of subcontractors who provide social
services pursuant to the rules and regulations of the FBCI. Granting
any authority to a religious institution beyond that of a
subcontractor has the primary effect of advancing religion,
endorsing religion, and coercing religion. The master contracts,
277. See Hanover, 626 F.3d at 13 (restating the three-step analysis in Lee, 505 U.S.
593, and noting the Supreme Court’s holding that “silence was, in the eyes of the
community, functionally identical to participation” in religious worship).
278. Cf. id. (pointing out that the Supreme Court in Lee used the two
premises—that students were being coerced into silence during the reciting of
the prayer and that silence was equivalent to participating in the prayer—to
come to the conclusion that students were therefore being functionally coerced
into participating in the prayer).
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such as the one created between the HHS and the USCCB, violate
all three primary Establishment Clause tests used by the Supreme
Court and cannot be allowed.

